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Korean Institutional Reform in Comparative Perspective
Marcus Noland and Erik Weeks
Korea is arguably the premier development success story of 
the last half century. Despite this success, there has been a 
nagging sense among many observers that the development 
of Korea’s economic and political institutions has not kept 
pace with the breakneck tempo of economic growth. During 
the decade since the 1997–98 fi nancial crisis, center-left 
governments have placed considerable emphasis on insti-
tutional reform. Accomplishments have included the estab-
lishment in 1998 of the Financial Supervisory Commission 
(recently renamed the Financial Services Commission) and 
the introduction of new regulatory practices, approaches, 
and standards; the passage of the Anti-Corruption Act in 
2001 and the establishment of the Korea Independent Com-
mission against Corruption in 2002; and the development 
of more robust civil society institutions such as the Council 
for the Korean Pact on Anti-Corruption and Transparency 
founded in 2005.
Now, 10 years after the crisis, coinciding with an electoral 
shift to the center-right, is an opportune time to take stock 
of the progress made during the past decade. The country’s 
institutional development has relevance beyond the specifi c 
case of Korea: the importance of institutions versus other 
factors is subject to considerable dispute in development 
economics literature, and whether Korea, the development 
exemplar, conforms to the “institutions rule” notion is of 
broader intellectual interest.1
To address these questions, this paper exploits the grow-
ing body of quantitative data on institutional performance. 
Specifi cally, this project examines 52 institutional indica-
tors covering 44 countries from four sources: Transparency 
International’s (TI) “Corruption Perceptions Index,” the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
research project, the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), and the Institute for 
Management Development’s (IMD) World Competitiveness 
Yearbook (WCY). Data on governance and corruption are 
derived from the fi rst three sources; all other time-series 
tranches are derived only from the World Competitiveness 
Yearbook. These sources allow us to analyze on a consistent 
international basis Korea’s relative performance over the 
past decade.
A preview of the conclusions: Improvements in Korea’s 
political and economic institutions during the past decade 
have outstripped the country’s “First World economy, Third 
World politics” image. Although the data are noisy, and Ko-
rea generally underperforms modestly relative to its level of 
per capita income, the country is not an outlier; and on most 
2indicators Korea is converging on global norms. It would be 
hard to argue on the basis of this analysis that institutional 
development has led economic growth in Korea.
Korea’s Performance
Koreans have high expectations about what the public sector 
can deliver. In the 2007–08 World Economic Forum survey 
(as in those of prior years), local business executives identi-
fi ed “policy instability” and “ineffi cient bureaucracy” as the 
two biggest problems in doing business in Korea, followed 
by tax rates and factor market rigidities (Figure 1). At the 
other extreme, infrastructure, labor quality, and crime and 
theft are the least of their concerns. In other words, in this 
self-assessment the country does well in terms of the provi-
sion of basic inputs—labor and capital—but poorly in the 
political economy of their management.
We examine fi rst- and last-year data for each indicator in 
order to gauge the degree of improvement in various aspects 
of institutional quality and competitiveness. Unfortunately, 
the beginning and ending years are not the same for all data 
sources, but retaining time-series information in this case 
supersedes the desire for standardization in the time sample. 
The “Corruption Perceptions Index” data (which take into 
account lagged data from the year before) begin in 1996 
and end in 2007; the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
data begin in 1996 and end in 2006; and the World Com-
petitiveness Yearbook data begin in 1998 and end in 2007. 
The Global Competitiveness Report data are reported only 
from the latest report, issued in 2007 by the World Economic 
Forum, and are not available for the starting year.
Of less consequence is the difference in ending years. Dif-
ferences in the beginning year may be more problematic. 
Worldwide Governance Indicators and “Corruption Per-
ceptions Index” data both begin in 1996, prior to the Asian 
fi nancial crisis, whereas World Competitiveness Yearbook 
data begin in 1998 at the height of Korea’s fi nancial crisis. 
Although there may have been very little fundamental 
change in institutional quality or competitiveness in certain 
dimensions during this time, a massive economic crisis 
could certainly have an adverse effect on perceptions of 
Korean institutions. This caveat must be considered where 
large absolute or relative improvements in Korea’s scores 
are observed.
Table 1 reports rankings for 1996 and 1998, the two start-
ing years of the sample, and for 2006 and 2007 and also 
the change in rankings during this period. A higher number 
indicates stronger performance on that criterion. As the left 
panel shows, at the outset all of Korea’s scores were below 
the mean, and more than half were in the lowest quartile. 
Despite its reputation in some quarters, Korea did relatively 
well on the corruption indices, with scores ranging from 32 
to 41—not good but far better than the multiple indices on 
which it was in the lowest decile.
The right panel reports results for 2006–07 as well as the 
change in rankings. Korea scored at or above the mean 
in 18 of 52 categories although this improvement may 
be exaggerated somewhat by the inclusion of the Global 
Competitiveness Report data, in which Korea tends to do 
fairly well. Korea’s rankings improved in the vast majority 
of categories, with double-digit improvements on bureau-
cracy (20 percentile points), personal security and private 
property (13 percentile points), government decisions 
(11 percentile points), and political parties (10 percentile 
points). On the corruption rankings, for example, the range 
rose from 32–41 percent at the beginning of the sample 
period to 34–48 percent at its end—still below the mean 
but an improvement.
Table 1 places Korea in comparative relief, reporting Ko-
rea’s percentile rankings on institutional indicators from the 
four sources calculated for a consistent 44-country sample. 
(The country sample, defi nitions of the indicators, and 
other details are reported in the Appendix.) The higher the 
percentile ranking, the better Korea performed relative to 
the comparator countries sampled for this paper. For some 
indicators, such as corruption, we report multiple variants 
derived from different sources as an implicit check on the 
robustness of the survey.
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Figure 1: The Most Problematic Factors for Doing Business 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 
2007).
Note: From a list of 14 factors, respondents were asked to select the 5 most 
problematic for doing business in their country and to rank them between 1 
(most problematic) and 5. The bars in the fi gure show the responses weighted 
according to their rankings.
3One conundrum is that local conditions may be improving 
in an absolute sense (which local residents may observe 
and appreciate), but the country could still be falling behind 
in relative terms—which may be the relevant criterion for 
other actors, say, international investors. In Figure 2 through 
Figure 6, the data are reorganized into fi ve broad categories 
(governance and corruption, political institutions, domestic 
business institutions, international business institutions, 
and societal institutions), and standardized scores (taking 
into account the cross-country dispersion of the individual 
indices) are graphed.2 The southwest quadrant indicates 
performance below the mean in both the starting and ter-
minal years of the sample; the northwest quadrant depicts 
below-average performance at the start and above-average 
performance at the end. In the case of Korea, the other two 
quadrants are empty. Observations above the 45-degree line 
signal improvement, below it means deterioration.
Figure 2 displays data on governance and corruption. Most 
of the indicators lie above the 45-degree line, indicating 
relative improvement. Two—the “Corruption Perceptions 
Index” from Transparency International and the control of 
corruption indicator from the World Bank—lie below the 
line, indicating deterioration in relative position. However, 
the third corruption indicator, bribing and corruption from 
the Institute for Management Development’s World Com-
petitiveness Yearbook, shows an improvement. Note how 
tightly packed the governance and corruption indicators 
Table 1: Institutional Percentile Rankings (First and Last Year Available) 
Beginning percentile rank Ending percentile rank
Indicator Percentile Indicator Percentile
Government Effectiveness (WGI) 43 Burden of government regulation (GCR) 91 n.a.
Corruption perceptions index (TI) 41 Centralization of Economic Policymaking (GCR) 85 n.a.
Public service (WCY) 41 Favoritism in decisions of government officials (GCR) 77 n.a.
Control of Corruption (WGI) 39 Wastefulness of government spending (GCR) 73 n.a.
Personal security and private property (WCY) 39 Public trust of politicians (GCR) 70 n.a.
Political Stability (WGI) 36 Personal security and private property (WCY) 68 13
Rule of Law (WGI) 36 Diversion of public funds (GCR) 59 n.a.
Voice and Accountability (WGI) 36 Bureaucracy (WCY) 57 20
Harassment (WCY) 34 Reliability of police services (GCR) 57 n.a.
Bribing and corruption (WCY) 32 Intellectual property protection (GCR) 57 n.a.
Justice (WCY) 32 Ethical behavior of firms (GCR) 55 n.a.
Labor regulations (WCY) 27 Property rights (GCR) 55 n.a.
Competition legislation (WCY) 23 Business costs of crime and violence (GCR) 55 n.a.
Customs authorities (WCY) 20 Efficiency of legal framework (GCR) 55 n.a.
Regulatory Quality (WGI) 18 Stringency of environmental regulations (GCR) 53 n.a.
Adaptability of government policy (WCY) 18 Parallel economy (WCY) 52 20
Government decisions (WCY) 16 Public service (WCY) 50 4
Discrimination (WCY) 16 Government Effectiveness (WGI) 50 3
Bureaucracy (WCY) 11 Bribing and corruption (WCY) 48 7
Investment incentives (WCY) 11 Judicial independence (GCR) 48 n.a.
Transparency (WCY) 9 Efficacy of corporate boards (GCR) 48 n.a.
Product and service legislation (WCY) 9 Transparency of government policymaking (GCR) 48 n.a.
Foreign investors (WCY) 9 Business Costs of Corruption (GCR) 46 n.a.
Parallel economy (WCY) 7 Political Stability (WGI) 45 4
Legal and regulatory framework (WCY) 5 Business costs of terrorism (GCR) 45 n.a.
Political parties (WCY) 5 Protection of minority shareholders’ interests (GCR) 45 n.a.
Immigration laws (WCY) 5 Strength of auditing and reporting standards (GCR) 45 n.a.
International transactions (WCY) 5 Organized crime (GCR) 43 n.a.
Public sector contracts (WCY) 5 Justice (WCY) 43 5
Price controls (WCY) 2 Rule of Law (WGI) 43 3
Protectionism (WCY) 2 Government decisions (WCY) 41 11
Harassment (WCY) 41 3
Voice and Accountability (WGI) 41 2
Corruption perceptions index (TI) 39 -1
notes: Regulatory Quality (WGI) 36 8
n=44 Transparency (WCY) 34 11
high percentile ranking corresponds to better performance Adaptability of government policy (WCY) 34 7
WCY = World Competitiveness Yearbook Control of Corruption (WGI) 34 -2
series begins in: 1998 Customs authorities (WCY) 32 5
series ends in: 2007 Political parties (WCY) 27 10
GCR = Global Competitiveness Report Investment incentives (WCY) 25 6
series begins in: n.a. Legal and regulatory framework (WCY) 23 8
series ends in: 2007 Labor regulations (WCY) 23 -2
TI = Transparency International Competition legislation (WCY) 20 -1
series begins in: 1996 Price controls (WCY) 18 7
series ends in: 2007 Product and service legislation (WCY) 18 4
WGI = World Governance Indicators Protectionism (WCY) 16 6
series begins in: 1996 Public sector contracts (WCY) 16 5
series ends in: 2006 Foreign investors (WCY) 14 2
Discrimination (WCY) 11 -2
Immigration laws (WCY) 9 2
International transactions (WCY) 7 1
Sources: Institute for Management Development 2008, Transparency International 2007, World Bank 2007, WEF 2007
Change in 
overall rank
Change in overall rank represents the number of places, 
on a scale of 1-44, that South Korea has moved up or 
down between the beginning and ending year
4are—all are within a single standard deviation of the mean. 
Neither Korea’s profi le nor the change in its profi le appears 
dramatically different from those of the comparator coun-
tries on this basket of indicators. Somewhat more dispersion 
is evident for data on political institutions, all of which show 
improvement over the sample period (Figure 3).
Korea exhibits the most outlying behavior with respect to 
international business institutions, where three of the eight 
indicators are more than two standard deviations below 
the mean at the beginning of the sample period (Figure 5). 
Perhaps driven by the reforms undertaken in the wake of the 
crisis, all of the international business institution indicators 
show improvement, falling above the 45-degree line.
The data on domestic business institutions show yet more 
dispersion, with the price controls indicator being more than 
two standard deviations below the mean (a crude indicator 
of a truly outlying observation) in 1998 (Figure 4). Four 
of the fi ve indicators are above the 45-degree line, the sole 
exception being the critical indicator of labor regulations, 
although in this case it is so close to the line that the ap-
parent deterioration in relative performance may not be 
statistically signifi cant.
In the final tranche of indicators, societal institutions 
(Figure 6), three of the four indicators show improvement, 
with one, personal property and personal security, landing 
in the northwest quadrant, indicating better-than-average 
performance at the end of the sample period. Conversely, 
the worst performance was on the discrimination indicator, 
where Korea’s performance was below the norm at the start 
and then deteriorated further.
 
Figure 2: Governance and Corruption 
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Figure 3:  Political Institutions 
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Figure 4: Domestic Business  Institutions 
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Figure 5: International Business 
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5Income and Convergence
Thus far we have examined Korea’s status without any 
reference to its level of development or that of its compara-
tors. It is evident from cross-national data that the quality of 
institutions increases with income; what is more controver-
sial is whether this relationship is causal. One possibility is 
that good institutions lead to good performance. The other 
is that with rising incomes governments come under both 
internal and external pressure to improve institutions and 
practices.
To get a sense of how Korea stacks up in these surveys, 
in Table 2 we report Korea’s “neighbors” for each indica-
tor—the countries just above and just below Korea in the 
ranking—and the ratio of Korean per capita income to its 
neighbors’ incomes. (For this calculation we use all avail-
able data because we are trying to identify the countries 
to which Korea is most similar, not establish a consistent 
ranking.) The countries appearing most frequently as Ko-
rea’s neighbors in 1996 and 1998 are Japan (fi ve entries), 
followed by Venezuela and the Czech Republic (four entries 
each). For 2006 and 2007, Israel and Slovenia (fi ve and four, 
respectively) are Korea’s most common neighbors.
For each of the five institutional baskets, on average, 
Korea’s institutions are most similar to countries that are 
poorer than it is. There are exceptions. Korea’s neighbors 
with respect to personal security and private property, 
for example, are signifi cantly richer than it is in both the 
starting and terminal years of the sample period and by an 
increasing margin, as the ratio of per capita incomes rises 
from 1.22 to 1.58.
 
Figure 6: Societal Institutions 
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However, Korea does not appear to gravitate toward higher-
income neighbors, in general. A signifi cant average increase 
in the per capita income ratio in governance and corruption 
is offset by a decline with respect to international business 
institutions.
This analysis can be made more rigorous by regressing each 
of the institutional indicators on per capita income.3 The 
estimated regression for the fi rst indicator, Transparency 
International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index,” for the 
terminal year of the sample period, 2007, is displayed in 
Figure 7. The estimated regression indicates that a 1 percent 
increase in purchasing power–adjusted per capita income is 
associated with a 0.57 percent improvement in the “Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index.” In this particular case, the Korean 
observation lies below the regression line, indicating that 
Korea has a higher-than-expected perception of corruption 
(that is, a lower “Corruption Perceptions Index” score) than 
would be expected on the basis of its income level.
In Figures 8 through 12, we report the Korean studentized 
residuals from similar regressions on each institutional 
indicator for each year, organized by the fi ve baskets. (The 
studentized residual can be interpreted as the t-statistic 
associated with a dummy variable added to the regres-
sion for that particular observation.) As a rule of thumb, 
a studentized residual exceeding 2.0 in absolute value is 
notable.4 So, for example, in the case of governance and 
corruption (Figure 8), most of the Korean residuals are 
negative, indicating underachievement relative to income 
 
Figure 7: Corruption perceptions Index and Income Per Capita, 2007 
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6Indicator
High Low High Low beginning year ending year
Governance and corruption
Corruption perceptions index (TI) Malaysia Greece South Africa (tie) Malaysia (tie) 0.97 0.52
Control of corruption (WGI) Czech Republic Malaysia American Samoa Italy 0.82 1.30
Bribing and corruption (WCY) Italy Russia Slovenia Israel 1.11 1.16
Regulatory quality (WGI) Jamaica Bahamas Trinidad and Tobago South Africa 0.66 0.64
Rule of law (WGI) Kuwait Malaysia Czech Republic Oman 0.97 0.87
Political stability (WGI) Tunisia Argentina Cyprus Vietnam 0.60 0.69
Government effectiveness (WGI) Chile Oman Israel Spain 0.74 1.24
Voice and accountability (WGI) Mongolia Papua New Guinea Tuvalu Israel 0.16 1.31
Average income ratio for tranche 0.75 0.96
Political institutions
Adaptability of government policy Czech Republic Sweden Taiwan Lithuania 1.41 0.98
Bureaucracy China Colombia Israel Hungary 0.36 1.05
Government decisions Greece South Africa Slovak Republic United Kingdom 1.08 1.11
Legal and regulatory framework Colombia Venezuela France Russia 0.46 0.90
Public service Austria France Lithuania Belgium 1.87 1.05
Political parties Venezuela Japan Hungary Czech Republic 1.13 0.90
Transparency Venezuela Turkey Turkey Spain 0.47 0.76
Average income ratio for tranche 0.97 0.96
Domestic business institutions
Competition legislation Czech Republic Hungary Italy Lithuania 0.98 0.97
Labor regulations Argentina Greece Philippines Argentina, Portugal 1.22 0.22
Price controls Poland (none) Slovak Republic Slovenia 0.69 0.90
Parallel economy India Russia Germany Sweden 0.30 1.35
Product and service legislation Venezuela Colombia Romania Croatia 0.46 0.52
Average income ratio for tranche 0.73 0.79
International business institutions
Customs authorities Philippines Argentina Italy Slovak Republic 0.61 1.01
Foreign investors Japan Thailand India China 1.12 0.25
Investment incentives Poland Japan Mexico Japan 1.26 0.89
Immigration laws Switzerland Japan Israel Russia 1.97 0.91
International transactions Poland India Argentina Thailand 0.43 0.53
Protectionism China (none) Russia Slovenia 0.25 0.78
Public sector contracts China Japan Ukraine Argentina 1.04 0.51
Average income ratio for tranche 0.95 0.70
Societal institutions
Discrimination India Indonesia Indonesia Poland 0.19 0.41
Harassment Hungary Czech Republic Hungary Slovenia 0.98 0.92
Justice Chile Brazil China South Africa 0.62 0.44
Personal security and private property Chile Italy Ireland Japan 1.22 1.58
Average income ratio for tranche 0.75 0.84
Most frequently occurring neighbors 
and overall average income ratio
0.84 0.86
Sources: International Monetary Fund 2008, Transparency International 2007, WEF 2007, World Bank 2007 
Average income ratio 
(neighbor: South Korea)
Table 2: Public Institutions Indicators and South Korea's "Neighbors"
Japan (5), Venezuela and Czech 
Republic (4)
Israel (5), Slovenia (4)
Beginning year neighbors Ending year neighbors
level. Some improvement is, however, evident over time—
Korea remains an underperformer, though by a narrowing 
degree—and, if one adopts the rule of thumb that a studen-
tized residual more than 2.0 in absolute value signals a true 
outlier, Korea is within tolerance on all of the governance 
and corruption indicators.
Similar patterns are obtained in Figure 9 and Figure 10 
regarding political and domestic business institutions. Most 
residuals are negative, and the margins are narrowing. The 
absolute value of the studentized residuals tends to be larger, 
particularly for domestic business institutions. There are 
some instances of dramatic improvements: two indicators 
on which South Korea appears to be a real negative outlier 
at the beginning of the sample period—political parties 
and legal and regulatory framework—show signifi cant 
improvements, as does bureaucracy (“bureaucracy does 
not hinder business activities”), which actually displays 
Figure 8: Governance and Corruption 
-2 
-1.5 
-1 
-0.5 
0 
0.5 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
studentized residuals 
Corruption perceptions index Control of corruption 
Government effectiveness Political stability 
Rule of law Regulatory quality 
Voice and accountability Bribing and corruption 
7positive residuals in the last four years of the sample. 
Among the domestic business institutions, price controls 
show striking improvement, and by the end of the sample 
period none of the indicators deviates signifi cantly from 
the international norm.
However, in Figure 11 on international business institutions, 
the magnitudes of the studentized residuals are generally 
larger, and evidence of improvement over time is less obvi-
ous. There is a dramatic improvement in the protectionism 
residual, even if it remains negative throughout the sample 
period. Nevertheless, by the end of the sample period, all 
seven indicators are within rule-of-thumb margin of toler-
ance.
Figure 9: Political Institutions 
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Figure 10: Domestic Business Institutions 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
studentized residuals 
Competition legislation 
Labor regulations 
Price controls
Parallel economy 
Product and service legislation 
 
Figure 11: International Business Institutions
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Finally, Figure 12 shows Korea’s residuals for societal 
institutions. Korea generally does better than expected 
on personal security and private property, though not by 
a signifi cant margin. The country fares relatively poorly 
on the discrimination indicator that “discrimination with 
respect to race, gender, age, etc., does not hinder economic 
development.”
Conclusion
In recent years academic economists have come to appre-
ciate the centrality of public institutions in contributing to 
economic performance. Yet Korea, arguably the premier 
success story of the last half century, has sometimes been 
described as a First World economy with Third World in-
 
Figure 12: Societal Institutions 
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8stitutions. Although the country modestly underachieves on 
most of the 52 criteria examined in this paper, Korea is not 
an outlier, and on most indicators it is converging on global 
norms from below. It would be diffi cult to argue narrowly 
on the basis of this analysis that institutional development 
led economic growth. Institutions do not appear to rule, at 
least in Korea.
The patterns on specifi c indicators suggest that global 
institutions play some role as an external policy anchor. 
International trade policy, for example, has been the area 
in which there has been the greatest consensus about and 
articulation of international norms (such as free trade in 
goods), and international institutions such as the World 
Trade Organization have been the most developed. In the 
fi nancial arena, there is less consensus about best practices 
with respect to either domestic institutions or external 
relations, and the international institutions (Bank for In-
ternational Settlements and the International Monetary 
Fund) have been relatively less successful in promoting 
an international consensus about desirable norms. In ar-
eas such as labor policy, there has been little consensus 
beyond some minimal standards (that is, prohibitions on 
forced or child labor); and the international institution, the 
International Labour Organization, has been, and remains, 
weak. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which Korea joined in 1996, has 
been at the forefront of anticorruption activities but has no 
enforcement power. In the area of competition policy, there 
has been little consensus about desirable practices, and no 
international organization (except perhaps the OECD) has 
really addressed these issues.
Perhaps it is not surprising then that Korea has made great 
progress on protectionism (admittedly from a low base made 
possible by the lack of enforcement power in the World 
Trade Organization’s forerunner, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, and the “special and differential” 
provisions that made commitments by developing countries 
nonbinding). Arguably, Korea’s next best performance has 
been in fi nancial reform and issues relating to investment, 
and probably the worst performance has been in the largely 
domestic arenas of competition and labor policy. The reason 
is straightforward: the existence of international norms 
gives policymakers a goal to aim for, and the existence of 
international institutions (and other avenues of international 
diplomatic pressure) helps in overcoming the historical 
weakness and parochialism of Korean public institutions.
Appendix A: Survey Data on Institutional 
Performance
In recent years a cottage industry has developed centered on 
various organizations’ attempts to construct cross-national 
data on the quality of public institutions. Although the 
data are considerably noisy, these indicators are useful, 
if imperfect, tools for cross-country and intertemporal 
comparison.
As mentioned in the paper earlier, this study employs four 
sources of quantitative institutional data: Transparency 
International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index” (CPI), the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
the Institute for Management Development’s (IMD) World 
Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY), and the World Economic 
Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). 
We hope that the use of multiple sources will increase the 
reader’s confi dence in the salience of these scores. Two 
sources, WCY and GCR, present data on institutional com-
petitiveness of individual economies based on surveys of 
their own design,5 while the other two, WGI and CPI, are 
aggregates of a broader set of research on governance and 
corruption within countries.6 See the Appendix Table at the 
end of this paper.
Comparability issues within and across sources can occur 
contemporaneously between countries, within countries 
over time, and by extension between countries over time. 
Contemporaneous inconsistencies between countries can 
arise owing to standardization issues; a single respondent 
cannot know everything about his relative position in the 
world, so it is diffi cult to ensure cross-country consistency 
of standards. GCR and WCY, both of which gather data on 
institutional competitiveness of a host economy through ex-
ecutive opinion surveys, address cross-country standardiza-
tion by selecting participants who operate in an international 
capacity. Aggregate measures, which take a wider range of 
data into account, should help to smooth this effect over, 
but different sources also apply different aggregation and 
standardization methodologies when creating composite 
institutional indicators.
Scoring methodology differs among sources. As mentioned 
earlier, CPI and GCR scores consist of information from 
the current and previous years. CPI standardizes data from 
individual sources using a matching percentiles technique 
to normalize scores, applies a beta transformation to pre-
vent convergence in country scores over time, then aver-
ages these individual data inputs to calculate a CPI value 
for each country.7 WGI aggregates are calculated using an 
unobserved components model.8 WCY scores are country-
level averages of executive responses to the WCY execu-
tive opinion survey, whereas GCR applies a slightly more 
9nuanced weighted and time-discounted two-year moving 
average to score the results of the GCR executive opinion 
survey.
Country samples, data samples, and respondents may 
change in the data from year to year, and individual per-
ceptions may lag real institutional changes on the ground, 
introducing time inconsistencies into the data. Countries 
may also enter or exit from a data set over time, rendering 
changes in percentile rankings meaningless. A changing 
country sample can be addressed directly by limiting the 
number of countries to those with complete data. Some of 
the sources report data for larger country samples, but for the 
sake of comparability we report the rankings on a consistent 
sample basis. Adding relatively small, poor countries to the 
sample will tend to improve Korea’s rankings. In their most 
recent versions, the WGI research project compares 212 
countries and territories, CPI covers 180 countries, GCR 
covers 131 economies, and WCY covers 55 economies. 
From these four sources, we obtained a common set of 44 
countries for examination in this study: Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rus-
sia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, 
and Venezuela.
Once the underlying methodological differences between 
sources are accounted for, comparing scores across sources 
is simple. Individual country scores for each indicator are 
standardized by differencing each country’s score by the 
mean and then normalizing this difference by the indica-
tor’s standard deviation. Countries are also ranked across 
a consistent sample to help detect relative improvements 
against a group of comparator countries.
A fi nal issue to consider is that these sources are not entirely 
independent from one another. Both CPI’s and WGI’s ag-
gregate measures of governance and corruption incorporate 
data from both GCR and WCY, meaning that their apparent 
consistency may be illusory. Conversely, divergences might 
signal fragility in these indices.
Marcus Noland is Senior Fellow and Erik Weeks is Re-
search Assistant at the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics.
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Appendix Table: Indicator Labels, Descriptions, and Sources
Indicator Description Source
Governance and corruption
Bribing and corruption Bribing and corruption do not exist IMD
Control of corruption Extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests
WB
Corruption perceptions index Aggregate measure of the “extent of corruption” with corruption 
being defined as the use of public power for private gain
TI
Government effectiveness Quality of public services, quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies
WB
Political stability Perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism
WB
Regulatory quality Ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulation that permit and promote private sector 
development
WB
Rule of law Extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence
WB
Voice and accountability Extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media
WB
Political institutions
Adaptability of government 
policy
Adaptability of government policy to changes in the economy is 
high
IMD
Bureaucracy Bureaucracy does not hinder business activity IMD
Government decisions Government decisions are effectively implemented IMD
Legal and regulatory framework Legal and regulatory framework encourages the competitiveness 
of enterprises
IMD
Political parties Political parties do understand today’s economic challenges IMD
Public service The public service is independent from political interference IMD
Transparency Transparency of government policy is satisfactory IMD
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Domestic business institutions
Competition legislation Competition legislation is efficient in preventing unfair 
competition
IMD
Labor regulations Labor regulations (hiring and firing practices, minimum wages, 
and so forth) do not hinder business activities
IMD
Parallel economy Parallel (black-market, unrecorded) economy does not impair 
economic development
IMD
Price controls Price controls do not affect pricing of products in most industries IMD
Product and service legislation Product and service legislation does not deter business activity IMD
International business institutions
Customs authorities Customs authorities do facilitate the efficient transit of goods IMD
Foreign investors Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic 
companies
IMD
Immigration laws Immigration laws do not prevent a company from employing 
foreign labor
IMD
International transactions International transactions can be freely negotiated with foreign 
partners
IMD
Investment incentives Investment incentives are attractive to foreign investors IMD
Protectionism Protectionism does not impair the conduct of a company’s 
business
IMD
Public sector contracts Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders IMD
Societal institutions
Discrimination Discrimination (race, gender, age, and so forth) does not hinder 
economic development
IMD
Harassment Harassment (unethical behavior, mobbing, violence) is adequately 
addressed
IMD
Justice Justice is fairly administered IMD
Personal security and private 
property
Personal security and private property are adequately protected IMD
GCR public institutions
Property rights Property rights, including over financial assets: 1 = are poorly 
defined and not protected by law, 7 = are clearly defined and well 
protected by law
WEF
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Intellectual property protection Intellectual property protection in a specific country: 1 = weak and 
not enforced, 7 = is strong and enforceable
WEF
Diversion of public funds Diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or groups due 
to corruption: 1 = is common, 7 = never occurs
WEF
Public trust of politicians Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians: 1 = very low, 7 
= very high
WEF
Judicial independence Judiciary independent from political influences of members of 
government, citizens, or firms: 1 = is heavily influenced, 7 = is 
entirely independent
WEF
Favoritism in decisions of 
government officials
When deciding on policies and contracts, government officials: 1 
= usually favor well-connected firms and individuals, 7 = are 
neutral
WEF
Wastefulness of government 
spending 
Public spending in the country: 1 = is wasteful, 7 = provides 
necessary goods and services not provided by the market
WEF
Burden of government regulation Complying with administrative requirements (permits, regulations, 
reporting) issued by the government in the country is: 1 = 
burdensome, 7 = not burdensome
WEF
Efficiency of legal framework Legal framework in the country for private businesses to settle 
disputes and challenge the legality of government actions and/or 
regulations is: 1 = inefficient and subject to manipulation, 7 = 
efficient and follows a clear, neutral process
WEF
Transparency of government 
policymaking
Firms in the country are usually informed clearly by the 
government on changes in policies and regulations affecting 
specific industry: 1 = never informed, 7 = always informed
WEF
Business costs of terrorism Threat of terrorism in the country: 1 = imposes significant costs on 
business, 7 = does not impose significant costs on business
WEF
Business costs of crime and 
violence
Incidence of common crime and violence (e.g., street muggings, 
firms being looted): 1 = imposes significant costs on businesses, 7 
= does not impose significant costs on businesses
WEF
Organized crime Organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) in the 
country: 1 = imposes significant costs on businesses, 7 = does not
impose significant costs on businesses
WEF
Reliability of police services Police services: 1 = cannot be relied upon to protect businesses 
from criminals, 7 = can be relied upon to protect businesses from 
criminals
WEF
Ethical behavior of firms Corporate ethics (ethical behavior in interactions with public 
officials, politicians, and other enterprises) of firms in the country 
are: 1 = among the world’s worst, 7 = among the world’s best
WEF
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Strength of auditing and reporting 
standards
Financial auditing and reporting standards regarding company 
financial performance in the country are: 1 = extremely weak, 7 = 
extremely strong, the best in the world
WEF
Efficacy of corporate boards Corporate governance by investors and boards of directors in the 
country is characterized by: 1 = management has little 
accountability, 7 = investors and boards exert strong supervision 
of management decisions
WEF
Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests
Interests of minority shareholders in the country: 1 = not protected
by law and seldom recognized by majority shareholders, 7 = 
protected by law and actively enforced
WEF
Centralization of economic 
policymaking
Economic policymaking in the country: 1 = centralized—national 
government controls almost all important decisions, 7 = 
decentralized—states and cities have important decision rights 
affecting economic development
WEF
Business costs of corruption Illegal payments influence government policies, laws, or 
regulations, and impose costs or otherwise negatively affect the
company: 1 = yes, they have a significant negative impact, 7 = no, 
they have no impact
WEF
Stringency of environmental 
regulations
How stringent is the country’s environmental regulation: 1 = lax 
compared to most countries, 7 = among the most stringent
WEF
IMD = Institute for Management Development, World Competitiveness Yearbook
TI = Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index”
WB = World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators project
WEF = World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report
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Sources Used for the Evaluation
“Corruption Perceptions Index.” Berlin: Transparency International, 
2007. www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
Global Competitiveness Report 2007–2008. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan (World Economic Forum), 2007.
World Competitiveness Yearbook. Lausanne: Institute for Manage-
ment Development, 2008. www.imd.ch/research/publications/wcy/
index.cfm.
Worldwide Governance Indicators Project. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 2007. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/.
Endnotes
1. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, Institutions 
as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, NBER Working 
Paper no. 10481 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2004; Edward L. Glaeser et al., “Do Institutions Cause 
Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2004): 271–303; Benja-
min F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken, “Do Leaders Matter? National 
Leadership and Growth since World War II,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 120, no. 3 (2005): 835–64.
2. Scores are standardized by subtracting the mean from the observed 
score for each year, and dividing this difference by the standard 
deviation of scores for that year.
3. Figures 8 through 12, which correspond to the regression analysis, 
display South Korea’s studentized residuals from cross-sectional or-
dinary least squares regressions for every year and indicator. In each 
simple regression, the level score for each institutional indicator is 
regressed on the log of per capita income, effectively creating a crude 
form of per capita income control. The residuals are then studentized 
to allow for comparison across institutional indicators because they 
are originally scored on different scales and therefore not readily 
comparable without some form of standardization. Per capita income 
is measured in purchasing power terms as reported in the International 
Monetary Fund’s “World Economic Outlook” database.
4. David A. Belsley, Edwin Kuh, and Roy E. Welsch, Regression 
Diagnostics: Identifying Infl uential Data and Sources of Collinearity 
(New York: Wiley, 1980).
5. Perceptions may vary among managers operating in different 
economic sectors, so data collection agencies such as IMD and 
WEF collecting primary data from executive surveys must ensure 
that a broadly representative sample of managers is obtained. The 
most recent iteration of the WCY survey was completed by 3,700 
executives from 55 economies, and the GCR survey was completed 
by 11,000 executives in 131 economies; see Suzanne Rosselet-
McCauley, “Methodology and Principles of Analysis,” IMD World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 2007 (Lausanne: Institute for Management 
Development, 2007), www.imd.ch/research/publications/wcy/upload/
methodology.pdf; World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness 
Report (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Both surveys ask re-
spondents to judge local conditions relative to a global best-practices 
benchmark on an ordinal scale. GCR records and reports these results 
on a scale from 1 to 7, and WCY has executives rank conditions on 
a scale from 1 to 6 and then converts these scores to a 1-to-10 scale 
for reporting. The WEF and its network of affi liates attempt to get 
a cross-section of respondents from fi rms of differing sizes across a 
range of activities, tapping partner affi liate institutes to ensure that 
a relatively heterogeneous sample is selected across countries. The 
IMD takes a similar approach, capturing the opinions of upper and 
middle management from both domestic and multinational fi rms 
across a broad range of economic sectors that operate internationally. 
These managers are asked to evaluate conditions within their host 
economy from an international perspective. A potential weakness of 
this approach is that the respondents may not know enough about 
the best practices to meaningfully compare with local circumstances. 
Respondents to survey questionnaires will by necessity change over 
time owing to expanding samples, staff changes at the fi rms and 
organizations being surveyed, and a variety of other reasons. To ad-
dress this issue, the IMD encourages alumni to participate in each 
sequential survey. For our purposes, time inconsistencies as they may 
exist are irrelevant in the case of GCR because we examine only a 
single year of data from this source.
6. WGI examines six distinct aggregate indicators of governance 
composed of data from 33 sources provided by 30 independent or-
ganizations, and CPI aggregates data from 14 sources provided by 
12 independent organizations into a single measure of perceptions of 
corruption; see Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastru-
zzi, Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance 
Indicators, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 4280 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007); Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 
“The Methodology of the Corruption Perceptions Index 2007,” Trans-
parency International, Berlin, and University of Passau, 2007, http://
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi. CPI 
incorporates data from the past two years in order to mitigate abrupt 
random shifts in a country’s CPI score; see also World Economic 
Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2007. WCY’s single-year 
survey does not incorporate lags and is more susceptible to random 
shifts in perceptions but has the advantage of being more immediately 
responsive to real changes in the quality of public institutions.
7. See Lambsdorff, “The Methodology of the Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2007.” A consequence of matching percentiles is that it reduces 
the standard deviation of individual scores. The beta transformation 
remedies this by widening the standard deviation.
8. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VI.
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